Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions

The Jesse Carter Collection

7-13-1954

Kesler v. Pabst [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Kesler v. Pabst [DISSENT]" (1954). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 235.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/235

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

254

KESLER '!J. PABST

The motion to dismiss
to the Board of Governors
and
the commission of the offense
Hallinan \vas convicted involved moral
or other misconduct
disbarment
suspension.
concurred.

and

Shenk,
did not

herein.

F. No. 18997. In Bank.

BER'l'HA KESLER et
[1] Husband and Wife-Community Property-Damages for Personal Injury.-In absence of agreement to
of action for

to either husband or wife
are
property, and it is
necessary to
of one spouse to the other to prevent ne::;ll£~en
profiting
his own wrong.
[2] !d.-Actions-Defenses-Husband's Contributory
-Where husband and wife sustained
to
interest in her
to exercise control
action and cannot
a<=;~u,o;c!.!V<O and thus create an
See Cal.Jur.2d,
Community Property, § 36.

McK. Dig. References:
§ 189

Husband and
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for

her
wife
fullreeovery.
Id.- Actions- Defenses- Husband's Contributory Negligence.---\Vhere wife did not secure entire interest in her cause
action for personal injuries
occurrence of events beyond
husband's control, but secured
if at all, only because
relinquished it to
reason for rule imputing
to hrr has not eeased to exist, and he is unjustly
his wife her full recovery.

APPBAI1 from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
}fateo
Affirmed.
~\ction by

husband and wife for damages for personal inarising out of collision of vehicles. Judgment for def('ndant aflirrnrd.
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Parker,

It is unnecessary to determine

rule of
of causes of
ders ineffective a
such a cause of action executed
cause of action has
arisen.
Perkins v. Suuset
& Tel. Co., 155 Cal. 712,
71H-ni [10:5 P. 190].)
BJYPll if it is assumed that such
a relinquishment is effee.tive bcti\'een the spouses, its execution
does not
the
husband from profiting by his
own wrong.
his act of
Mr. Kesler sought
to exercise control oyer his interest in the community cause
up his
in the recovery. The right
of action and
to dispose of
constitutes a major interest
of the owner
the exercise of such right the
owner could avoid
of his contributory negligence
and thus create an enforceable
in his donee that did not
theretofore exist, he would in
his own wrong.
A.ccordingly, the
of
unjust enrichment
cannot be accomplished
a
relinquishment of the
negligent husband's interest to his wife.
It is
however, that the logical consequence of
the holding in Plores v.
supm, is that a negligent
husband is not
enriched
his 1vife's recovery after
he has relinquished his interest in her eause of action to her.
In support of this contention it is urged that in that case
the wife was allowed to recover for all of the damages suffered
by her, although her husband's interest must have passed
through his estate to her on his death. The argument concludes that since no
ust enrichment resulted in that case
by permitting the husband's interest to pass to his wife through
his estate, no unjust enrichment would result by allowing
him to
his interest to her directly. This contention overlooks the peculiar character of the wife's cause of action for
personal injuries. [3] Although it was determined in Me43 C.2d-9
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Fadden v. Santa Ana etc.
CaL 464
P.
11
L.RA.
, that the wife cause of action is community
property, it remained the settled
even before section 370
of the Code of
Procedure was amendC'd in 1913 to allow
the wife to sue
that the wife was a necessary party
to the action.
v. SrmtheTn Pac.
167 Cal. 786,
790-791 [141 P. 388].
As was pointed out in the l\1 oody
r•ase this rule was adopted at c:ommo11 law to prPvent the
eause of action for tlw wife
from
on her
husband's death. (See also Fink v. Campbell, 70 F. 664,
667 [ 17 C.C.A. 325] ; Fowler v. Frisbie. 8 Conn. :520, 824;
Fuller v. Naugatuck Railroad
21 Conn. 557, 573-57 4;
Church v. Town
45 Vt. 380, 385; Horandt
v. Central R. Co.
New Jersey, 78 N.J.T~. 190
Atl. 93,
''Although at common law the cause of action for the wife's
suffering was the separate property of the husband, it was
settled that the wife was a necessary party to the suit, the
reasoning being that, as the authorities express it, she was
the 'meritorious cause of action,' and that in case of his death
pending suit the cause of action would survive to her. . . .
The proposition that, although the right of action is community property, yet the wife is a necessary party in this particular class of cases, is no more illogical than the rule at
common law that the ·wife must join though the right was
the separate property of the husband. The reasons for the
decisions under the common law are applicable to the ease
where the right is eommunity property, as fully and completely as to the case where it is the husband's separate property." (Moody v. Southern Pac. Co., supm, 167 Cal. 786,
790-791 [141 P. 388 .) [4] Thus, since on her husband's
death, the wife's entire cause of action survives to her by operation of law, the husband cannot, either by exercising or failing
to exercise his power of testamentary disposition over half
of the community property, affect his wife's rights in her
cause of action. Accordingly, he is not unjustly enriched by
allowing his wife her full recovery. [5] In the present case,
on the other hand, Mrs. Kesler did not secure the entire interest in her cause of action by the oecnrrence of events beyond
her husband's control; she secured it, if at all, only because he
voluntarily relinquished it to her, and ac:eordingly, the reason
for the rule imputing his negligenep to her hfls not ePased to
exist.
Amici curiae eontend that to the extent that the wife has
been given the management and control of the damages re-
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[ 43 C.2d 254; 273 P.2d 257]

covered
her for her personal injuries by section 171c* of
the Civil Code, the husband's interest therein has become so
attenuated that it should not be considered sufficient to justify
his negligence to her. In the light of this statutory
it is contended that the evil of permitting the negligent defendant to escape liability is no longer outweighed
the benefits the
spouse might secure by his own
wrong.
supra, 39 Cal.2d 622, 632.)
In this connection it is pointed out that the older cases in
which the wife's negligence was imputed to her husband were
decided primarily on an agency theory, and not on the theory
that the wife's nonmanagerial interest in the community propwas sufficient to justify imputing negligence to prevent
her from profiting by her own wrong. (See opinion on denial
of hearing by the SuprE'me Court in Keena v. United Railroads
S. F., 57 Cal.App. 124, 132 [207 P. 35] .) Since it is now
settled that the family relationship standing alone is not suffident to convert family activities into joint enterprises, or to
make one spouse the agent of the other, for purposes of
imputing negligence (Flores v. Brown, supra, 39 Cal.2d 622,
630, and cases cited), it is contended that the entire doctrine
of imputed negligence between spouses should be re-examined
in the light of the statutory change with respect to the right
of management and control of damages recoverable for personal injuries. In the present case, however, the cause of
ar.tion arose before section 171c was added to the Civil Code
in 1951, and at a time when l\Ir. Kesler was entitled to thE'
management and control of any damages his wife might re(~over. Aeeordingly, it is unnecessary to decide at this time
*"Notwithstanding the pro•isions of Section 161a and 172 of this
eode, and subject to the prodsions of Sections 164 and 169 of this code,
the wife has the management, control and disposition, other than testa·
mentary except as otherwise permitted by law, of community property
money earned by her, or community property money damages received
h;v her for personal injuries suffered by her, until it is commingled with
other community property, except that the husband shall have management, control, and disposition of such money damages to the extent
necessary to pay for expenses incurred by reason of the wife's personal
in,juri('s.
''During such time as the wife may have the management, control
and disposition of such money, as herein provided, she may not make
a gift thereof, or dispose of the same without a minable consideration,
without the written consent of the husband.
''This section shall not be construed as making such money the separate property of the wife, nor as changing the respective interests of
t!Je husband and wife in such money, as defined in Section J 6la of
this code.''

C.2d
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rule of

the in-

Schaner,
CAR'l'ER, J.--I
of action in the wife for her
I cannot
personal
cause of action.'' As I
pointed out
v.
88 Cal.2d
, the wife }ws a right to sue
315, 325,
(Code Civ. Proe .. § 370; Sanalone for her
567 [110 P.2d 1025]), and
derson v.
propthe recovery therefor should be her sole and
de Funiak, Prineiples of Community
erty
232; 24 CaJ.I_,.Rev. 7:19, 741; Hest.
Property, pp.
Torts, § 487) .
In the
I
out that since the 1921
amendment to section 370 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
a married lvoman may
lvitl10ut l1er husband
joined
as a party in all aetions ". .
those
·injury to
her person. . . . '' and that any recovery received by her
should, logically, be her
and personal property. This
court, however, continues to
1vithout due consideration,
that the cause of action
tbe wife's
InJuries is a
community cause of aetion and that any recoyery therefor
should also be
This holding, carried to
the injured, wholly innocent,
cent if her husband was guilty
hold that since the wife
any recovery therefor
not constitute jndicial
reasonable interpretation
common ::;ense. The
wife of a contribu-
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compensano reason why the
obstacle here should not be
with even greater
ease. To hold that
injuries of a
married person
numerous
injustices which
for example, that
a wife is
for the loss of a leg.
The sum recovered
becomes community property
over which the husband has controL He may dissipate it, or
spend it unwisely. The
may be dissolved, through
death or
and the wife \Yill be left without any compensation for her
and permanent disability.
Presumably, however, in the situation which I have just suggested this court would permit the husband to relinquish his
share in the sum recowred to the wife if he so desired.
In the instant case. the wife's en use of action for her injuries
arose when the accident occurred. Thereafter, the husband
sought to relinquish to her,
written agreement, any interest he might have in that cause of action. In holding that
the negligent husband would still be profiting by his own
wrong, a majority of this court says ''Even if it is assumed
that such a relinquishment is effective betvveen the spouses,
its execution does not
th0
husband from
profiting by his own ·wrong. By his act of relinquishment
Mr. Kesler sought to exercise control over his interest in the
community cause of action and
up his rights in the recovery. The right to
of
however, constitutes
a major interest of the owner
and if by the exercise
of such right the owner could avoid the effect of his contributory negligence and thus create an enforceable right in
his donee that did not th0retofore exist, he would in fact
profit by his own wrong. Accordingly, the objective of preventing unjust enrichment cannot be accomplished by a voluntary relinquishment of th0 negligent husband's interest to
his wife.'' When this holding is considered in connection
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with that of Flores v. Brown, 39 CaL2d 622
P.2d 922 ,
it becomes at once apparent that
of this court will
fit its law to the facts as it chooses withont
1 either
logic or justice.
In 1he F'lores cast~. Mr. Flores and a son were killed. Mrs.
I<'lores and their daughter were injured. This court refused
10 impute thr contributory
of
wife so as to bar her reeovery for her
their son. It was there said: "·when the
ts
hmvever, the interests in any
these causes
action become
separate property. and it becomes possible to
the
elt~mcnts of damag"'s that ·would, except for the community
property system, be considered personal to each spouse.
Under these circumstances the objective of preventing unjust
enrichment may br accomplished by barring only the interest
of the negligent spouse or his estate.
"l\T r. Flores died in the same accident in which his wife
was injurrd. 'I'o allow her to recover for her personal injuries will in no way enrich Mr. Flores m· those who might
lake through him . . . .
'' VVhen thP husband is dead, not only is the reason for
the rule imputing his negligence to his wife gone, but to
apply it defpats its own purpose. It is but a windfall to a
defendant who nPgligently injures a wife or causes the deatl1
of a minor child that recovery may be barred because the
wife's husband was also negligent. Although allowing the
negligent dt>fendant to escape liability has been considered
a lesser evil than allo•ving the negligent spouse to profit from
his own wrong. surely the former evil may not be balanced by
the lattrr 1vhen the latter is no longer present." (Emphasis
added; Flores v. Brown, supm, 39 Cal.2d 622, 631-632.)
The cause of action for personal injuries, or death, arises
at the time of the aeciLlent. rt bas heen held that a cause of
action for personal injuries of either a husband or wife
is community property. Mrs. Flores' cause of action for
ber own personal injuries was, therefore, community propPrty beeausr it arose at the time of the accident in which her
husband was killed. The marriage was not dissolved by
death pTiot to the timf' the cause of action arose! Any
damages rer•oyerable are so only beeause of the eause of action.
Had it uot been for the cause of aetion there would have been
no recovery. If the eause of action is community property,
thn1 the reeoYery must also be eomrnunity property inasmueh
as this court has held that a relinquishment after the cause

KESLER V. pABST
[43 C.2d 254; 273 P,2d 257]

263

of action has arisen is ineffectual! To hold that Mr. Flores'
death, after the cause of action arose, was sufficient to release
to Mrs. Flores any recovery for her personal injuries but
points out the factual similarity between the two cases and
the illogical dissimilarity in the holdings. To be sure, Mr.
Flores could not actually spend the money recovered by
Mrs. Flores, but through his death he enabled his widow to
receive a benefit she would not otherwise have had because
of his contributory negligence. By his death, he created
in her an ''enforceable right . . . that did not theretofore
exist" and "in fact" profited by his own wrong! The majority, however, finds no unjust enrichment in the Flores
case and, in so finding, permits an event occurring after the
cause of action arosP to change the character of the cause of
action. In this case \Ye find no such "permission" and the
injured spouse is barred because her negligent spouse might
profit from any recovery even though he has voluntarily
relinquished any and all interest he might have in that
recovery.
Other states with identical statutes have reasoned the
matter out logically and have concluded that personal injuries
reqnire personal compensation. In Soto v. Vandeventer, 56
N.M. 483 [245 P.2d 826], two questions were raised. The
first was whether a married woman in New Mexico had
the right to prosecute in her own name a cause of action
against one who negligently inflicted bodily injuries upon
her; and the second was whether the proceeds of a judgment
on account of such injuries belonged to the wife as her
srparate property or were an asset of the community of herself
and husband. The definition of what constitutes separate
property of either spouse is identical to that pertaining in
California (Civ. Code, §§ 162, 163), as is the definition of
that which constitutes community property (Civ. Code,§ 164).
The Supreme Court of New Mexico, in an opinion written
by the able and learned Chief ,Justice James B. McGhee, held
that a married woman so injured had the right to prosecute
in her own name a cause of action against one who negligently
injured her, and that the proceeds of any judgment recovered
hy her would be her sole and separate property.
In Soto v. Vandeventer, supra, the New Mexico Supreme
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice McGhee, has this so say:
"\V e are of the opinion that reason, justice and a fair
interpretation of our community statute, construed either
in the light of the common or Spanish law, require that wr

our notice.
''Under the
horse she had
motor vehicle "'"" ""'~'"

if the wife were
a
and some driver of a

cause of action for the
but that for the injury to
to the
her would
to
and the husband would
a
In addition,
receive one half of the
refuse to bring suit for the
the husband
injuries the wife bad sustained. \Ve decline to adopt such
a rule in New Mexico.
''The cause of action for the
to the community
for medical expenses, loss of services to the community, as well
as loss of
if any, of the wife still belongs to the
community, and the husband as its head is the proper party
to bring such an action
one who wrongfully injures
the wife.''
Nevada also holds that
for a personal injury
belongs to the person
Fredrickson v. Watson
Canst. Co. v.
60 Xev. 117 [J02 P.2d 627, 628].) In
the Fredrickson ease,
court said that " [ i] n fixing the
classification of the
from compensation for
a personal injury to the y;ife in this case, it seems unnecessary
to discuss the refinements invo1Yed in the question of whether
a chose in action for a tort is
for the reason that
the judgment and
be property, and the

right 1!iolated,

. the

phasis added.)
It should also be noted that Orrin K. lVIcl\:furray, former
Dean of the
UniYersity of California, calls the
doctrine of recovery
for personal
"utter nonsense" (2
Cal.hRev. 161, 162). In an article
Green, "The Texas
the doctrine is strongly
Death Act," 26 Texas L. Rev.
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ec1.), section
from the wife the cause of action
her
of personal security,
v•;as not intended to do." Mr.
also states that the
to personal security is
individual and cannot be held in common with another. Mr.
DeF'uniak
of
§
feels
that the
to the person is intended to
or make whole the
and that the compensation
of the same character as that which has been injured
suffered loss.
A
of this court refuses to construe section 171c
of the Civil Corle which was added in 1951 after the decision
in the Zaragosa case because the cause of action here involved
arose before that time. It is
opinion now, as it was at the
time the Zaragosa case was
that no such addition to
the Code was necessary in order to enable the wife to hold
any recovery for her personal injuries as her sole and separate
property. It will be interesting indeed to see how section
171c will be interpreted by this court when the occasion
•
f
anses.
I would reverse the judgment and order appealed from.

F. No. 18975.

In Bank.
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DOLOHES DUNN, as Special Administratrix, etc., Appellant,
v. P£\CIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (a
Corporation), Respondent.
[1] Appeal-Dismissal-Judgment or Order Ineffectual-Nonsuit.
-Order
motions for judgment of nonsuit, not having
been entered in minutes prior to entry of written judgment of
nonsuit, is ineffective and a purported appeal therefrom will
be dismissed.
[2] Dismissal-Nonsuit-When Motion Granted.-A motion for
nonsuit may properly be granted only when, disregarding
conflicting evidence and giving plaintiff's evidence all the value
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Dismissal, Discontinuance and K onsuit, § 48;
Am.Jur., Dismissal, Discontinuance and Konsuit, § 42.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 912.5; [2) Dismissal,§ 75; [3] Electricity,§ 3; [4, 7] Electricity,§ 17; [5) Electricity, §21(2); [6] Electricity, §16; [8] Easements, §35; [9]
Electricity, § 21; [10-12] Electricity, § 31.

